bee-js Supply Chain Attack: npm and Swarm Desktop Steal Node Wallets
A threat actor used compromised GitHub accounts to ship a malicious @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 to npm and a trojanized, signed Swarm Desktop 0.56.2. Both steal Bee node wallet files and drop a backdoor that reads its C2 from the SleepyDuck Ethereum contract.
Threat card
- Threat type
- Supply Chain
- Disclosed
- Nov 9, 2026
- Affected
- @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 (npm), Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 (Linux, macOS, Windows) and dependents that allow bee-js 13.3.0
The short version
- Compromised GitHub accounts shipped a malicious @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 to npm and a signed, notarized Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 on 9 November 2026.
- Both builds fetch JavaScript from frameworkmetrics[.]xyz that steals the Bee node config.yaml password and swarm.key keystore.
- Stage 3 drops a Go backdoor on macOS and Linux and a ScreenConnect client on Windows, with the hub read from an Ethereum contract.
- Socket ties the infrastructure to the SleepyDuck / EtherDuck Open VSX campaign through the same contract, wallet, payloads and relay.
The bee-js supply chain attack turned Ethersphere’s own release pipeline against Swarm users. On 9 November 2026 a threat actor used compromised GitHub accounts to publish a malicious @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 to npm and a signed, notarized Swarm Desktop 0.56.2, according to Socket’s Threat Research Team. Both builds steal Bee node wallet files and drop a backdoor whose command server is read from an Ethereum smart contract. Anyone who installed either version should treat the machine and its wallet as compromised.
What happened
Attackers pushed an unsigned commit that added a loader to bee-js, then triggered the project’s trusted publishing workflow, so the malicious package shipped to npm as latest with valid SLSA provenance. They also built and signed a trojanized Swarm Desktop release. Both fetch JavaScript from api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz and run it with full Node.js privileges.
npm removed bee-js 13.3.0 about 75 minutes after publication, and GitHub issued advisory GHSA-hh7j-5m3j-23pf. The Swarm Desktop release stayed up about 8.5 hours, and its auto-updater offered it to Windows x64 and Apple Silicon users. Socket ties the later stages to the same Ethereum contract Pluto Security linked to the SleepyDuck, also called EtherDuck, Open VSX extension campaign. StepSecurity independently analysed the npm package and alerted the maintainers.
The pattern echoes recent pipeline compromises Threatspedia has covered, such as the NIKKE launcher CDN tampering: trusted distribution, signed artifacts and a backdoor that only the release path could deliver.
Timeline
| Date (UTC) | Event |
|---|---|
| 14 Mar 2026 | Ethereum C2 contract 0xf8a900Db...E40C344 deployed. |
| 24 to 26 Sep 2026 | EtherDuck / SleepyDuck Open VSX extensions use the same contract, per Pluto Security. |
| 6 Nov 2026 | Failed secret-harvesting attempts against Ethersphere CI using webhook[.]site and pastebin[.]com. frameworkmetrics[.]xyz registered at 15:08. |
| 8 Nov, 23:30:47 | Operator updates the C2 hub value in the contract. |
| 8 Nov, 23:59:54 | Unsigned commit de2f74e adds the loader to bee-js. |
| 9 Nov, 00:06:01 | Release v13.3.0 created, starting the publish workflow. The loader runs three times inside the publishing job. |
| 9 Nov, 00:09:50 | bee-js 13.3.0 published to npm as latest. |
| 9 Nov, 00:41 to 00:44:55 | Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 built, signed, notarized and uploaded; auto-updater begins offering it at 00:43:17. |
| 9 Nov, 01:24:58 | npm removes 13.3.0; GitHub advisory GHSA-hh7j-5m3j-23pf follows at 01:25:27. |
| 9 Nov, 09:04 | Ethersphere deletes the v0.56.2 tag; release gone by about 09:14. |
How the attack works
Initial access: release identities and weak workflow gates
Socket attributes the pushes to two GitHub accounts: nugaon, a maintainer with force-push rights to an unprotected master, and bee-worker, the release automation identity. How both were compromised is not disclosed; StepSecurity says the evidence points to misuse of the bee-worker identity, likely through a stolen credential or token. The commit bypassed the open release-please pull request.
The bee-js publish job accepted any release event without checking that the commit sat on a protected branch, and the publish environment had no required reviewers or tag policy. For Swarm Desktop, the actor created an emergency/0.56.2 branch and ran pre-release.yml, a manually dispatched workflow that accepts any branch and holds the Apple and Windows signing certificates and notarization Apple ID.
Execution: install hook and Electron loader
In bee-js, package.json shipped the scripts folder and renamed prepare to postinstall, so scripts/generate-version.cjs runs on install. It requests /v1/analytics with the OS name as User-Agent and the header X-Ethersphere: 1, then compiles the response with the Function constructor and runs it with the real require and process. Errors are suppressed, so a clean install log does not prove the code did not run. npm 11 and earlier, Yarn Classic and Yarn Berry before 4.14.0 run dependency postinstall scripts by default.
In Swarm Desktop, a 731-byte insertion in dist/desktop/src/index.js inside app.asar runs first in main() on every launch, calling /v1/electron with no timeout or error handling.
Collection and exfiltration
Requests without the X-Ethersphere header get a harmless decoy. With it, the server returns OS-specific JavaScript that reads Swarm Desktop’s config.yaml, which holds a plaintext password, and data-dir/keys/swarm.key, an encrypted V3 keystore, and posts both to /v1/swarm/report. Together they expose the node wallet. It then downloads a stage 3 implant from /v1/assets/.
Persistence and command and control
On macOS and Linux, a Go backdoor (module evjawbreaker) lands in ~/.solidity/ and persists as the systemd user unit solidity-langsupport-runner.service or the LaunchAgent com.solidity.langsupport.runner. It exits if it detects a debugger or VM, reads its hub address from the contract getter param1() through public RPC gateways such as rpc.ankr.com and cloudflare-eth.com, and connects over TLS without certificate validation, giving the operator a persistent sh pseudo-terminal.
On Windows, staged %TEMP%\.stuffed-* files run an obfuscated invoke.ps1. Admin users are elevated silently with UACME method 39 against mmc.exe; others see repeated UAC prompts. It adds a Defender exclusion, silently installs a genuine ConnectWise-signed ScreenConnect 25.4.3 client as the SYSTEM service ScreenConnect Client (5cbe79c9c25524df) pointed at relay 185.232.84[.]169:8041, then removes the exclusion and staging files.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Tactic | Technique (ID) | How it was used here |
|---|---|---|
| Initial access | Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) | Malicious bee-js 13.3.0 and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 shipped through official channels. |
| Initial access | Valid Accounts (T1078) | Compromised nugaon and bee-worker GitHub identities. |
| Execution | JavaScript (T1059.007) | postinstall hook and Electron loader run server-supplied JavaScript. |
| Defense evasion | Code Signing (T1553.002) | Swarm Desktop signed and notarized with the project’s own certificates. |
| Defense evasion | Masquerading (T1036) | Persistence named as Solidity language support. |
| Credential access | Private Keys (T1552.004) | swarm.key keystore and config.yaml password stolen. |
| Command and control | Dead Drop Resolver (T1102.001) | Hub address read from Ethereum contract getter param1(). |
| Command and control | Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105), Web Protocols (T1071.001) | Stage 2 and stage 3 fetched over HTTPS from frameworkmetrics[.]xyz. |
| Persistence | Launch Agent (T1543.001), Systemd Service (T1543.002), Windows Service (T1543.003) | LaunchAgent, systemd user unit and ScreenConnect service. |
| Privilege escalation | Bypass User Account Control (T1548.002) | UACME method 39 against mmc.exe. |
| Command and control | Remote Access Software (T1219) | Unattended ScreenConnect client on Windows. |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) | Wallet files posted to /v1/swarm/report. |
Who is behind it
Not yet attributed to a named group. Socket links the operation to the SleepyDuck / EtherDuck campaign that Pluto Security documented on 1 October 2026: the contract write history matches write for write, the owner wallet is the same, six of Pluto’s seven payload hashes match files downloaded from the bee-js C2, and the persistence names, ScreenConnect instance ID and relay address are identical. Socket identified the actor from GitHub push events rather than commit authorship, because commits used spoofed identities. Socket also found a second contract and wallet with obfuscated values that no known client reads.
Affected products and versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed / safe | CVE | CVSS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
@ethersphere/bee-js (npm) |
13.3.0 | Pin 13.2.0 | None; GHSA-hh7j-5m3j-23pf | Not assigned |
| Swarm Desktop (all nine Linux, macOS, Windows packages) | 0.56.2 | Socket recommends 0.56.3; verify it has shipped | None | Not assigned |
| Dependents allowing 13.3.0 | @ethersphere/swarm-cli 3.6.0, 3.7.0; @ethersphere/bee-dashboard 0.37.0, 0.37.1 (0.33.0 to 0.36.2 indirectly); @snaha/swarm-id 0.5.0 to 0.8.0; @solarpunkltd/file-manager-lib 1.1.0, 1.1.1; bee-wasm-js 0.1.0, 0.1.1 |
Resolve to 13.2.0 and purge caches | None | Not assigned |
Exposure was short but real. bee-js had 3,741 downloads from 1 to 8 November, and Socket estimates on the order of ten fetches of 13.3.0. Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 logged 65 download counts by 08:27 UTC, an upper bound that includes researchers. As of 10:30 UTC on 9 November, the Huawei Cloud npm mirror still served the malicious tarball.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator (defanged) | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz |
Paths /v1/analytics, /v1/electron, /v1/swarm/report, /v1/assets/ |
| IP:port | 193.57.9[.]155:4912 |
Current backdoor hub |
| IP:port | 193.57.9[.]17:4912, 178.16.54[.]222:4912, 107.189.27[.]223:4912, 107.189.27[.]46:4912, 91.108.240[.]156:4912, 107.189.16[.]215:4912 |
Earlier hubs |
| IP:port | 185.232.84[.]169:8041 |
ScreenConnect relay |
| Contract | 0xf8a900Db50b3331be6B768bA460BB59f3E40C344 |
Ethereum dead drop; owner 0xFd3fc58bcbd8ccc77b6000201438eDfc636E7cA7 |
| Commit | de2f74e784b2eafa0d66fbb6d88b42ea11ee34cf |
Malicious bee-js commit |
| SHA-256 | d01fdf241aa9e0a1ba6ebc19f8f667af1bf652745021c5050126cb7036f7ce58 |
bee-js-13.3.0.tgz |
| SHA-256 | ee2f762e9ed3fd89f106e0b80c2e923bf1aed9a280277d3d998a5902c4d9ec0f |
scripts/generate-version.cjs |
| SHA-256 | f81315968e679b48f6bdff1c9b928bb223230d07f44d7948412c2250c2a14deb |
dist/desktop/src/index.js, all 0.56.2 platforms |
| SHA-256 | 9b73e7cd4e1425e770392549d8df46c706139ef476f4f7b9ac405165dc8d9696 |
Stage 3 linux_amd64 |
| SHA-256 | 37d14bff30762ca701e9c1f8bc6c57c065bb20ae3a2208cb7411a6530610f08e |
invoke.ps1 |
| Paths / names | ~/.solidity/, com.solidity.langsupport.runner, solidity-langsupport-runner.service, ScreenConnect Client (5cbe79c9c25524df) |
Persistence |
Socket’s post lists the full set of package, installer and stage 3 hashes for every platform, plus the second contract and wallet.
Detection and hunting
Start with dependency data. Search lockfiles, package caches and internal registries for @ethersphere/bee-js@13.3.0 or its npm integrity value, and check CI logs for installs between 00:09:50 and 01:24:58 UTC on 9 November with lifecycle scripts enabled. On npm 11.16 to 11.21, look for an install-scripts warning naming the postinstall script.
For desktops, check bee-desktop.log for Bee Desktop version: 0.56.2 (production), written before the loader runs. Hunt DNS and proxy logs for frameworkmetrics[.]xyz and outbound TLS to port 4912 on the hub IPs, plus ScreenConnect traffic to 185.232.84[.]169:8041 from hosts that should not run ScreenConnect. Where RPC traffic is visible, Socket suggests hunting eth_call requests to the contract with data 0x02d91518, especially from binaries under ~/.solidity/. On endpoints, look for new LaunchAgents or systemd user units with Solidity names and a new SYSTEM service named ScreenConnect Client (5cbe79c9c25524df).
Mitigation and response
- Remove bee-js 13.3.0 from dependency resolution, pin 13.2.0 and purge caches and mirrors, including internal registries.
- Treat any machine or CI job that installed 13.3.0 with scripts enabled in the window as compromised, even if the install failed. Rotate every reachable credential, including cloud credentials available through CI OIDC trust.
- Uninstall Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 and install a clean release. Reinstalling does not remove
~/.solidity/, the LaunchAgent, the systemd unit or the ScreenConnect service, so remove those separately or rebuild the host. - Assume the Bee node password and key are stolen. From a clean machine, move node funds, chequebook and stake to a new key.
- Block
frameworkmetrics[.]xyz, the hub IPs and the ScreenConnect relay, and poll the contract getters for new writes. - Maintainers: require proof that released commits come from a protected branch or merged release PR, add reviewers and tag rules to publishing environments, and keep signing credentials away from manually dispatched workflows that accept any branch.
Analyst take
The uncomfortable lesson is that provenance worked exactly as designed and still certified malware. SLSA attestations proved the package came from Ethersphere’s workflow; they could not prove the commit deserved to be there. The same gap let a manually dispatched workflow sign and notarize a desktop app from an emergency branch. Build integrity without source integrity is half a control, and this operator found the missing half twice in one night.
The reuse of SleepyDuck infrastructure matters too. A blockchain dead drop lets the operator move hubs with one contract write, and the same Go builds and ScreenConnect relay jumped from Open VSX extensions to an npm library with no retooling. Crypto infrastructure projects, their node operators and any team whose CI installs JavaScript dependencies with lifecycle scripts enabled should take this one personally, as the fake GitHub security tools campaign showed earlier this month that developers remain a favoured entry point.
What to do now
0 of 5 done
Questions readers ask
Which bee-js version is malicious?
@ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0, published to npm on 9 November 2026 and removed about 75 minutes later; 13.2.0 is the last clean version.
What does the Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 malware steal?
It reads the Bee node config.yaml, which holds a plaintext password, and the swarm.key keystore, then installs a persistent backdoor.
Is SLSA provenance on bee-js 13.3.0 proof it is safe?
No. The malicious code was already in the source the trusted publishing workflow built, so the package carries valid provenance.
Sources
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