BO Team Exploits Log4Shell in vCenter to Reach Code-Signing Server
Kaspersky ICS CERT says BO Team (Black Owl) entered a Russian software developer through exposed SSH, used Log4Shell on vCenter 7.0.3 for root, took over hypervisors, GitLab, Ansible and the AD forest, and tried to plant a payload on the code-signing server.
Threat card
- Status
- Actively exploited
- Threat type
- Threat Intelligence
- Disclosed
- Nov 5, 2026
- Affected
- Russian software developer: VMware vCenter 7.0.3 (Log4j), hypervisors, GitLab, Ansible, Active Directory forest and code-signing server
The short version
- Kaspersky ICS CERT attributes the intrusion to BO Team (Black Owl, Hoody Hyena, Lifting Zmiy) with a high degree of confidence.
- Initial access was a password login to an internet-exposed SSH service, followed by Log4Shell exploitation of an internal vCenter 7.0.3 server for root.
- The attackers took over hypervisors, GitLab, Ansible and the whole AD forest, using DNS-switched cron backdoors and ReverseSSH for persistence.
- Attempts to plant a payload on the code-signing server were blocked, and no malicious software release was confirmed.
Kaspersky ICS CERT has published a full account of a BO Team Log4Shell intrusion in which the hacktivist and espionage group broke into a Russian software developer through an exposed SSH service, exploited CVE-2021-44228 on an internal VMware vCenter 7.0.3 server to get root, and worked its way through hypervisors, GitLab, Ansible and the Active Directory forest to the company’s code-signing server. No malicious release was confirmed. The case is a sharp reminder that unpatched Log4Shell on internal infrastructure still hands attackers the keys to a build pipeline five years on.
What happened
BO Team, also tracked as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena and Lifting Zmiy, compromised a Russian software developer over several months, moving from a single exposed SSH login to root on vCenter via Log4Shell and then to the code-signing server that signs the victim’s commercial builds. Kaspersky attributes the attack to BO Team with a high degree of confidence.
Kaspersky’s ICS CERT report on the BO Team supply chain attack, published on 5 November 2026, says the victim contacted the team in June 2025. Detection on the code-signing server blocked the injection attempts, and the victim’s response cut off access. The attackers later tried to return with phishing from the victim’s own DKIM-signed mail domain, which was detected and blocked. The Hacker News summary notes the group has been active since at least 2023 and is assessed to be of Ukrainian origin.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Not disclosed | Login to an internet-exposed SSH service on a Linux terminal server with a service account that allowed password authentication. |
| Following days | Internal scanning for SMB, Kerberos, SSH, Telnet, FTP, HTTP(S), WinRM and LDAP; Burp Suite routed through the SSH tunnel. |
| Not disclosed | Failed vCenter web logins, then Log4Shell exploitation of vCenter 7.0.3 for a root reverse shell; pivot to hypervisors and a second virtualization cluster. |
| Not disclosed | GitLab, Ansible and a domain controller compromised; ntds.dit copied; forest root domain reached. |
| Not disclosed | Attempts to plant a payload on the code-signing server blocked by endpoint protection. |
| June 2025 | Victim contacts Kaspersky ICS CERT. |
| Late July | Post-containment phishing from the victim’s DKIM-signed domain detected and blocked; C2 domains reactivated. |
| 5 Nov 2026 | Kaspersky ICS CERT publishes its report. |
How the attack works
Initial access: one exposed SSH login
The intrusion began with an SSH service on a Linux terminal server that was reachable from the internet and accepted password logins for a service account. From there the attackers spent several days scanning internal ranges, and Kaspersky’s report suggests they used Metasploit for the sweep. Blocked web requests recovered from a partially deleted proxy log showed interest in VMware, MikroTik, QNAP, vulnerability databases and Dependency-Track.
Privilege escalation: Log4Shell on internal vCenter
After failed logins to the vCenter web interface, the attackers exploited Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228, CVSS 10.0) in a vCenter 7.0.3 server and received a root reverse shell. They read the root SSH private key, connected to the hypervisor, enumerated reachable hosts and used the hypervisor’s certificate to reach a second virtualization cluster. They also created virtual network interfaces on hypervisors, likely for direct VM access over the VPN.
Persistence: cron jobs dressed as system components
On the hypervisor the group dropped /etc/cron.hourly/pgcache, disguised as a PostgreSQL component, and inside VMs /etc/cron.hourly/1vmware-timesync, which runs /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate. That loader decrypts an AES-256-CBC payload and runs it in memory as a ReverseSSH build with the attacker’s key. The backdoors only call home when the C2 domain’s DNS record points to a live server; otherwise it resolves to 127.0.0.1. Global Socket provided a further remote shell.
Credential access and domain takeover
The GitLab VM gave up repositories and its private key, which opened the Ansible server. Service account passwords sat in readable scripts. An administrator account, probably with a password pulled from VM memory, reached a domain controller, where the group dumped LSASS through rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll (MiniDump), used Nanodump, copied C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit with ntdsutil.exe and exported registry hives. Kaspersky says this enabled Kerberos ticket forging and, eventually, compromise of the whole forest.
Linux credential theft and wider pivot
About a day after the domain controller fell, the attackers modified /usr/bin/nxnode-login to write captured credentials to /dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174. They brute forced root on an admin workstation in about 2,500 attempts, ran a renamed nmap binary (/tmp/tmp303) and used the Ansible key against VPN, backup, network configuration backup and SIEM servers.
Objective: the code-signing server
Event logs on the signing server were deleted and overwritten, but recovered detections show a remote WMI attempt (PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic on WmiPrvSE.exe), a scheduled task (PDM:Trojan.Win32.GenAutorunSchedulerTaskRun.b) and an in-memory payload (HEUR:Trojan.Multi.Agent.c). Kaspersky reads this as an attempt either to inject code into builds before signing or to steal the signing certificate.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Tactic | Technique (ID) | How it was used here |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | External Remote Services (T1133) | Internet-exposed SSH on a Linux terminal server. |
| Initial Access | Valid Accounts (T1078) | Service account with password authentication. |
| Discovery | Network Service Discovery (T1046) | Scans for SMB, Kerberos, SSH, WinRM, LDAP and DNS (port 53). |
| Lateral Movement | Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210) | Log4Shell against internal vCenter 7.0.3 for root. |
| Lateral Movement | Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) | Stolen root and Ansible SSH keys used across Linux estate. |
| Persistence | Scheduled Task/Job: Cron (T1053.003) | pgcache and 1vmware-timesync in /etc/cron.hourly/. |
| Credential Access | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) | comsvcs.dll MiniDump and Nanodump. |
| Credential Access | OS Credential Dumping: NTDS (T1003.003) | ntdsutil.exe copy of ntds.dit. |
| Credential Access | Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files (T1552.001) | Service account passwords in readable scripts. |
| Credential Access | Modify Authentication Process (T1556) | Trojanized nxnode-login capturing credentials. |
| Credential Access | Brute Force (T1110) | About 2,500 root password attempts on an admin workstation. |
| Credential Access | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (T1558) | Ticket forging after ntds.dit theft. |
| Defense Evasion | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name (T1036.005) | Backdoors named as PostgreSQL and VMware components. |
| Defense Evasion | Indicator Removal: Timestomp (T1070.006) | Timestamps altered on backdoor files. |
| Defense Evasion | System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 (T1218.011) | LSASS dump via rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll. |
| Initial Access | Phishing (T1566) | Post-containment email from the victim’s DKIM-signed domain. |
Who is behind it
Kaspersky attributes the operation to BO Team with a high degree of confidence. The group is also tracked as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena and Lifting Zmiy, has been active since at least 2023, mixes cyber espionage with hacktivism and is assessed to be of Ukrainian origin. Its known tooling includes Mythic, Cobalt Strike, BrockenDoor and ZeronetKit.
The attribution rests on an LSASS dump command identical to an earlier BO Team intrusion apart from random file names, similar obfuscation and persistence style, the profile of a Russian software developer as a target, and attacker VPN addresses belonging to a provider in Lviv, Ukraine. Kaspersky itself notes some of these links are circumstantial. Activity also followed a working schedule close to the victim’s time zone.
Affected products and versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed | CVE | CVSS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VMware vCenter Server (Apache Log4j component) | 7.0.3 build in use at the victim, unpatched for Log4j | VMware’s Log4j updates for vCenter | CVE-2021-44228 | 10.0 |
| OpenSSH on Linux terminal and admin hosts | Configuration: internet exposure, password and root login enabled | Hardening (no CVE) | None | Not applicable |
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IP | 193.3.23[.]236 |
Attacker infrastructure |
| IP | 80.76.42[.]139 |
Attacker infrastructure |
| IP | 95.81.115[.]77 |
Attacker infrastructure |
| Domain | vmware-timecheck-api.nofrillsdns[.]com |
C2, DNS-switched |
| Domain | lo1yaizaeghaevarooD1ahtaichootae.nofrillsdns[.]com |
C2, DNS-switched |
| Domain | lo1yaizaeghaevarood1ahtaichootaz.nofrillsdns[.]com |
C2, DNS-switched |
| Domain | ip-223-6.dataclub[.]info |
Attacker infrastructure |
| MD5 | 346b04985ec6c5d107ba0ddf32fe7691 |
Linux bash backdoor (pgcache) |
| MD5 | 5aa8c19c897176502cf8d8fc543fafc7 |
Linux bash backdoor (vmware-toolbox-setdate) |
| MD5 | b86690213f0155f7b3b65832301ed932 |
Linux bash backdoor (second cluster) |
| MD5 | 6d12efa1db15121f88d58b9952e301ef |
Linux bash backdoor |
| MD5 | 68957de915e2a58339fa477f8078bdf4 |
ReverseSSH backdoor |
| MD5 | 5e04b2891635cbaa83ad619fe248e85b, 719e813e527920e83349e061b5b1590f, 86ff08749e77d5d078e929e5f9748504 |
Linux downloader scripts |
| MD5 | cb2908ef4cc042bfe856c84e9b61a2f9 |
Global Socket downloader script |
| File | /etc/cron.hourly/pgcache, /etc/cron.hourly/1vmware-timesync, /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate, /dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174 |
Persistence and credential capture |
Detection and hunting
On Linux and hypervisor hosts, list everything in /etc/cron.hourly/ and compare against package-owned files; pgcache and 1vmware-timesync are not legitimate names. Check the integrity of /usr/bin/nxnode-login against the NoMachine package and look for files under /dev/shm/ named like PulseAudio shared memory. Watch DNS for the nofrillsdns[.]com subdomains, including periods when they resolve to 127.0.0.1, because the backdoor stays dormant until the record changes.
On vCenter, review websso and appliance logs for JNDI lookup strings, and alert on outbound connections from the appliance to unknown hosts, which is where a Log4Shell reverse shell would appear. On Windows, hunt process creation (Sysmon event 1 or Security 4688) for rundll32.exe loading comsvcs.dll with MiniDump, for ntdsutil.exe touching ntds.dit, and for ie4uinit.exe, unregmp2.exe or fsquirt.exe spawned in unusual contexts. On signing servers, any WMI provider host child process or newly created scheduled task deserves immediate triage.
Mail teams should review DKIM key handling: in this case a stolen mail server key let phishing pass SPF and DKIM. Kaspersky’s report carries the full verdict list, including HEUR:HackTool.Linux.ReverseSSH.gen.
Mitigation and response
- Patch vCenter and every other internal product still carrying a vulnerable Log4j, starting with hypervisor management.
- Remove internet exposure of SSH, disable root login and password authentication, and set
MaxAuthTries. - Hunt for the IOCs above; if found, isolate affected subnets, reset all user and machine passwords, and reset the krbtgt password twice.
- Reissue SSH keys, GitLab and Ansible keys, VPN configurations, code-signing certificates and DKIM keys reachable from compromised systems.
- Separate hypervisor management, backups, CI/CD and signing infrastructure into isolated segments with default-deny rules and dedicated admin credentials.
- Remove plaintext credentials from scripts and enforce 2FA on VPN, RDP and domain controller access.
Analyst take
This intrusion is a textbook path to a software supply chain compromise that did not need a single new vulnerability. An exposed SSH login and a five-year-old Log4Shell bug on an internal appliance were enough to reach hypervisors, source code, automation keys and, almost, the signing server. The same hypervisor-first pattern showed up in the recent Xen Orchestra attacks on XCP-ng hosts, and the build-pipeline goal mirrors the Cursor Claude Code extension backdoor that Cursor traced to a stolen vendor key this month.
Software vendors should assume their signing and CI/CD systems are the real prize and defend them accordingly: separate networks, separate identities and tamper alerts that do not rely on logs an attacker can delete. Teams that still carry unpatched Log4j inside “trusted” management networks are exposed to any group that gets one foothold, hacktivist or otherwise.
What to do now
0 of 5 done
Questions readers ask
Who is BO Team?
BO Team, also tracked as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena and Lifting Zmiy, is a group active since at least 2023 that mixes espionage and hacktivism and is assessed to be of Ukrainian origin.
How did BO Team use Log4Shell?
After entering through exposed SSH, the group exploited CVE-2021-44228 in an internal VMware vCenter 7.0.3 server to get a root reverse shell and pivot to the hypervisors.
Did the attackers ship malicious software through the code-signing server?
Kaspersky found attempts to plant a payload on the signing server but says they were blocked and no malicious release was confirmed.
Sources
- Kaspersky ICS CERT: Supply chain attack: BO Team in a software developer's infrastructureics-cert.kaspersky.com
- The Hacker News: BO Team exploits Log4Shell in VMware vCenterthehackernews.com
- Cyber Recaps: Daily cybersecurity news, 16 November 2026cyberrecaps.com
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