Operation ShadowCloud: GitDoor, GraphDoor Hit Governments
Operation ShadowCloud hits government networks in Asia and Africa with new GitDoor and GraphDoor backdoors hiding C2 in GitHub and SharePoint. Hunt now.
Threat card
- Status
- Under investigation
- Threat type
- Nation-State
- Disclosed
- Nov 17, 2026
- Affected
- Government organisations in Asia and Africa, including a Taiwanese organisation / Windows hosts with MeshCentral Agent / credentials, cookies, keystrokes, screenshots
The short version
- Kaspersky disclosed Operation ShadowCloud, an active espionage campaign against governments in Asia and Africa.
- Two new backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor, hide command and control in GitHub, SharePoint via Microsoft Graph, and Ably.
- Attackers start from a MeshCentral Agent, likely reusing an earlier infection, then sideload encrypted payloads into memory.
- Kaspersky sees overlaps with China-nexus groups but has not confirmed attribution.
Last updated: 17 November 2026, 23:55 IST.
Summary: Operation ShadowCloud is an active cyber espionage campaign against government organisations in Asia and Africa that drops two previously undocumented backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor. The implants hide their command and control traffic inside GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint (via Microsoft Graph) and the Ably messaging service, so it looks like normal enterprise cloud use. Kaspersky says a Chinese-speaking group may be behind it, but attribution is not confirmed.
What happened in Operation ShadowCloud
Kaspersky researchers Saurabh Sharma and Noushin Shabab published a two-part analysis on 17 November 2026 describing Operation ShadowCloud, a campaign the company first identified in early 2026. According to The Hacker News report on the GitDoor and GraphDoor backdoors, the attackers target government sectors in Asia and Africa, and one documented intrusion hit an unnamed Taiwanese organisation.
Timeline (UTC where known):
- Late 2024: GitHub repositories used for GitDoor command and control are created, which suggests planning started at least this early.
- Early 2026: Kaspersky detects the campaign in victim environments.
- 17 November 2026: Kaspersky publishes its Securelist analysis of the GitDoor backdoor and a companion Securelist analysis of GraphDoor. The campaign is described as active.
Victim names, the number of compromised organisations and any data stolen have not been disclosed.
Who is behind it
Kaspersky has not named the threat actor. It reports partial overlap with China-nexus activity that Sophos tracks as Bronze Sandcastle, plus tactical similarities with FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle (also known as BlackTech). On several victim systems these groups used the same staging directories as GitDoor, and their implants appeared within one day of GitDoor being deployed. Kaspersky says this does not prove a direct link, but suggests a Chinese-speaking group may be developing or using the backdoors. Treat attribution as unconfirmed.
Technical details
Initial access and loading chain
The intrusions start from a MeshCentral Agent (MeshAgent), a legitimate remote administration tool. Kaspersky does not know how it was installed but sees signs of reuse of an earlier infection already present on the network. The agent contacts a hard-coded server and pulls down three files: a legitimate executable for DLL sideloading (start.exe, pythonw.exe or zoomit.exe), a rogue loader DLL (jli.dll, SbieDll.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll or libcef.dll), and an encrypted core payload. One loader type decrypts with RC4 followed by an XOR mask; a second uses XOR only. Both inject the backdoor into memory. The code uses control flow flattening and nested helper functions to slow analysis.
GitDoor
GitDoor uses two GitHub repositories as its command channel: a public one for receiving tasks and a private one for uploading results. It supports 26 commands, including file management, keylogging, proxying (including through Ably) and loading Base64-encoded COFF shellcode modules. Those modules add process injection via APC, service and scheduled task control, registry editing, local account creation, credential dumping with Mimikatz from LSASS, browser cookie theft from Chrome and Edge with CookieKatz, screenshots, extraction of the WhatsApp database key, forced NTLM authentication to an attacker host, and user idle-time checks.
GraphDoor
GraphDoor authenticates to a malicious Azure application through login.microsoftonline.com and uses the access token to talk to the Microsoft Graph API, staging data and fetching commands from a SharePoint drive. It creates an Intel_Log folder under Application Data, opens a named pipe and loads plugins for keylogging (kl.ts), process listing (pr.ts), screenshots (scr.ts), file relocation (moveDir.ts) and proxying (channel.ts, abchannel.ts, ab2channel.ts). The ab2channel plugin is a covert SOCKS5 proxy that tunnels TCP traffic through Ably’s WebSocket service. Traffic can also be relayed through a modified Erfrp client.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- T1219 Remote Access Software (MeshCentral Agent)
- T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading
- T1055.004 Asynchronous Procedure Call injection
- T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication (GitHub, SharePoint, Ably)
- T1090 Proxy
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1003.001 LSASS Memory credential dumping
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1136.001 Create Local Account
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
Published indicators
Indicators below come from Kaspersky’s research as reported by The Hacker News. Use them for hunting, not blocking alone.
- MeshAgent C2:
wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx - GitDoor GitHub repositories:
LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo(commands) andLatonyCharnleyaW/Trix(results) - Keylogger output file:
%APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat - GraphDoor working folder:
Intel_Logunder Application Data
The full hash list is in Kaspersky’s Securelist reports linked above.
Impact
The main risk is long-term, quiet espionage inside government networks. Because command traffic goes to GitHub, Microsoft Graph and Ably, network controls that allow these services by default will not flag it. The toolset can steal credentials, browser sessions and WhatsApp data, create accounts and tunnel traffic, which gives the operators durable access and room to move laterally. The plugin design lets them add functions without dropping new files on disk.
What security teams should do now
- Inventory every MeshCentral or MeshAgent installation and remove any that IT did not deploy. Block the published MeshAgent C2 address.
- Hunt for the keylogger file path and the Intel_Log folder on endpoints, and for signed binaries such as zoomit.exe or pythonw.exe loading DLLs from unusual folders.
- Review Entra ID for unfamiliar multi-tenant or newly consented applications with Graph file permissions, and audit SharePoint access by service principals.
- Alert on non-browser processes calling api.github.com, graph.microsoft.com or Ably endpoints from servers and workstations that have no business reason to.
- Check for Mimikatz-style LSASS access, new local accounts and new scheduled tasks on hosts with MeshAgent history.
- If you find matches, isolate the host, reset credentials for users who logged in to it and invalidate browser and cloud session tokens.
This campaign follows the pattern of cloud-hosted command channels seen in other recent espionage operations, including the BO Team intrusion into a code-signing server. This is a developing story and will be updated as more detail emerges.
What to do now
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Questions readers ask
What is Operation ShadowCloud?
An active cyber espionage campaign disclosed by Kaspersky on 17 November 2026 that targets government organisations in Asia and Africa with the new GitDoor and GraphDoor backdoors.
What is GitDoor malware?
A modular Windows backdoor that receives commands from a public GitHub repository and uploads results to a private one. It supports 26 commands, including keylogging, credential theft and shellcode loading.
How does GraphDoor use SharePoint?
GraphDoor logs in to a malicious Azure application, then uses the Microsoft Graph API to fetch commands and stage stolen data on a SharePoint drive, so its traffic looks like normal Microsoft 365 use.
Who is behind Operation ShadowCloud?
It is not confirmed. Kaspersky found overlaps with China-nexus groups such as Bronze Sandcastle, FamousSparrow and BlackTech and says a Chinese-speaking group may be involved.
Sources
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