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NIKKE Launcher Supply Chain Attack Planted K2F RAT via Tampered CDN

For about five weeks, four JavaScript files on Level Infinite's CDN made the NIKKE PC launcher fetch a LuaJIT remote access agent called K2F that steals browser passwords, developer and cloud secrets, and 28 crypto wallet extensions.

NIKKE Launcher Supply Chain Attack Planted K2F RAT via Tampered CDN

Threat card

Threat type
Infostealers
Disclosed
Nov 3, 2026
Affected
NIKKE PC launcher (Windows, plus Linux and Steam Deck via Proton) opened between 27 Sep and 4 Nov 2026

The short version

  • Four JavaScript files on Level Infinite's CDN were modified on 27 September 2026 to load attacker code into the NIKKE PC launcher.
  • The loader delivered K2F, a LuaJIT remote access agent that runs commands, takes screenshots and steals credentials.
  • K2F targets browser passwords and cookies, SSH keys, cloud and developer tokens, and 28 crypto wallet extensions.
  • The files were clean by 4 November, but cached copies and Chrome-based persistence can survive on infected machines.

The NIKKE launcher supply chain attack turned the official PC launcher for Goddess of Victory: NIKKE into a delivery channel for a remote access agent. Between 27 September and 4 November 2026, four JavaScript files served from publisher Level Infinite’s CDN were modified so that the launcher pulled a LuaJIT payload, tracked as K2F malware, from attacker infrastructure. The agent can run commands, take screenshots and harvest saved passwords, SSH keys, cloud tokens and crypto wallets. Anyone who opened the PC launcher in that window should check for infection and rotate secrets now.

What happened

Attackers gained write access to launcher assets on Level Infinite’s CDN and injected a small loader into four JavaScript files that the NIKKE PC launcher loads at startup. On some launches the loader fetched a second stage, which installed the K2F agent inside the launcher’s embedded browser and could persist through Chrome. How the attacker obtained CDN write access is not disclosed.

The compromise was first pieced together by players on the Chinese forum NGA and then documented in a detailed independent technical write-up on GitHub, which analysed the payload statically without running it. Inven Global reported on 3 November that neither SHIFT UP nor Level Infinite had commented at that point. According to the write-up, Level Infinite posted a statement on X on 4 November saying the launcher’s script files “may have been tampered with by a third party”, without naming files or giving users remediation steps.

The reports concern only the PC launcher. The mobile versions of the game are not named as affected. Linux and Steam Deck users who run the launcher through Proton are exposed as well, because Wine maps the Linux home folder into the Windows environment.

Timeline

Date (GMT) Event
2026-09-27 01:59 Domain insightjs[.]com registered; first TLS certificate issued about an hour later
2026-09-27 06:41 to 06:42 Four launcher JavaScript files on the CDN modified
2026-09-30 Earliest reported loader lookups
2026-10-06 First certificate for analytics.insightjs[.]com
2026-10-21 to 10-23 Infrastructure moves from 89.126.250[.]172 to 89.127.233[.]127
2026-10-23 16:40 Earliest reported K2F agent start on a victim machine
2026-10-28 15:46 FeedList.feb647c9.js cleaned at origin, but some CDN nodes kept serving the modified copy
2026-11-03 Inven Global reports the compromise; modified files replaced from 17:04; attacker server stops answering at 18:31
2026-11-04 03:13 Level Infinite statement on X acknowledges possible third-party tampering
2026-11-04 11:20 All four files clean on the four CDN servers checked by the researcher
2026-11-05 Aviatrix publishes its analysis of the campaign

How the NIKKE launcher supply chain attack works

Initial access: poisoned CDN scripts

The modified files were aegis-fix.min.js, images.7fec4c32.js, FeedList.feb647c9.js and vue-bucket.min.js, hosted on Level Infinite’s playerinfinite[.]com CDN. Each loaded hxxps://insightjs[.]com/l.js with a different f= parameter. The URL was hidden in an integer array decoded with TextDecoder, and the injected code added a script tag and then removed it. If the .com domain failed for 30 seconds, it retried insightjs[.]org, building the TLD with String.fromCharCode. In FeedList.feb647c9.js the 708 added bytes sat before the final export statement, so a check that only reads the end of the file misses them, as the technical write-up notes.

Execution: LuaJIT second stage

The loader fetched hxxps://analytics.insightjs[.]com/comm/assets/insight.bundle, a 205,135 byte file in the reference copy. It was written under a misleading .log name in Launcher\log\tinyget\, executed, then deleted. At least seven builds were observed. The agent is stripped LuaJIT 2.0 bytecode obfuscated with Prometheus, and any file in that folder starting with the bytes 1B 4C 4A 01 is the agent.

Command and control through the launcher

K2F has no direct network code. It registers a channel named k2f_chan with the launcher’s comm_center and relays all traffic through l.js inside the embedded browser tbs_browser.exe. It checks in roughly every 30 minutes and stores state in Local Storage under k2f.agent.state. Windows APIs such as CredEnumerateW, CryptUnprotectData and CreateProcessW are reached through LuaJIT FFI.

Credential access and collection

Server-chosen commands include exec, file browsing and download, multi-monitor screenshots, decryption of the saved NIKKE login, Chromium and Firefox password and cookie theft, a keyscan across 264 known secret paths, and theft from 28 crypto wallet extensions. Targets include SSH and GPG keys, AWS, Azure and GCP credentials, GitHub, npm, Docker, Kubernetes and Terraform tokens, AI coding tool credentials, shell history and project .env files. Aviatrix’s analysis highlights wallet extensions such as MetaMask, Phantom and Coinbase Wallet.

Persistence through Chrome

On Windows the agent can register a per-user COM class at HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{E77CC89B-7401-4C04-8CED-149DB35ADD04}\InprocServer32 pointing to platform_experience_helper.dll in a 64-hex subfolder under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\PlatformExperienceHelper\. Chrome then loads the DLL, so collection continues after the launcher closes. The HKLM copy of that CLSID pointing to wpc.dll is legitimate and should be left alone. Because the launcher manifest reportedly requests administrator rights, the agent may run elevated.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

Tactic Technique (ID) How it was used here
Initial Access Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) Launcher JavaScript modified on the publisher CDN
Execution JavaScript (T1059.007) Injected loader runs in the launcher’s embedded browser
Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) Integer-array URLs, Prometheus-obfuscated LuaJIT bytecode
Defense Evasion Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) Payload and temp files deleted after use
Persistence Event Triggered Execution: COM Hijacking (T1546.015) HKCU CLSID makes Chrome load the helper DLL
Credential Access Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) Chromium and Firefox saved passwords and cookies
Credential Access Windows Credential Manager (T1555.004) Developer entries read via CredEnumerateW
Credential Access Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (T1552.004) SSH and GPG keys collected
Collection Screen Capture (T1113) Screenshots of all monitors
Command and Control Web Protocols (T1071.001) HTTPS traffic to insightjs[.]com subdomains through l.js

Who is behind it

The attack is not yet attributed. No vendor or government has named an actor. The known infrastructure is two IP addresses at the Icelandic hosting provider 1984 ehf and the insightjs domains, the .org variant of which was later registered by a third party and now shows a warning page. The breadth of developer and cloud secrets targeted suggests the operator wanted far more than game accounts, but motive has not been stated by any source.

Affected products and versions

Product Exposure Status
NIKKE PC launcher (global and Japanese builds reported) Opened between 27 September and 4 November 2026 CDN files cleaned by 4 November; cached copies can persist
Launcher under Proton (Linux, Steam Deck) Home folder and environment variables readable Same window; treat all secrets as exposed
Data at risk Browser passwords and cookies, SSH and GPG keys, cloud and developer tokens, 28 wallet extensions Victim count not disclosed

No CVE applies, as this is a distribution compromise rather than a product vulnerability. Specific affected launcher versions were not published.

Indicators of compromise

Type Indicator (defanged) Context
Domain insightjs[.]com Loader host
Domain analytics.insightjs[.]com Payload and agent stage
Domain insightjs[.]org Fallback loader domain
Domain na.fleetlogd[.]com POST seen shortly before agent registration
IP 89.127.233[.]127 C2 from about 21 October
IP 89.126.250[.]172 Earlier C2
SHA-256 cc0ad05bfe85940a6067b3a72c182d3953339129206634141926d5d0b35973ec insight.bundle reference copy
SHA-256 2f2aac505f486067af6831d6c75ea74df63acb1ed4e4002709c5962c68bd9203 Modified FeedList.feb647c9.js
SHA-256 3aaafbd612f04501a6fdb0bb8b2f8a87796223e5584ac18ea5eb180feeafb193 Modified vue-bucket.min.js
SHA-256 21d2fa4b6cdd15da3d5246687a01ef84fb848668144258b110606db5eb5ea7ce Modified images.7fec4c32.js
SHA-256 04471ccf9f6ebac477ba4ca6b408a56621bccd16118c3112720adb35e6422e3d Modified aegis-fix.min.js
SHA-256 4bfaf98a6b863fa79554d9eeeb18870c3f92d552d62f4bd35a72d19ea68526af platform_experience_helper.dll (per Aviatrix)
Registry HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{E77CC89B-7401-4C04-8CED-149DB35ADD04} COM hijack persistence
String k2f_chan Agent channel name in launcher logs

Detection and hunting

The fastest endpoint check is Launcher/intl_service/debug.log in the NIKKE install folder. The infected sequence is k2f_chan registered, then adopted <uuid>, then agent started as <computer name>. In tinyget.*.log, curl perform success with total=205135 for insight.bundle shows the payload downloaded, while total=0 shows a failed fetch.

On the network, any DNS lookup of insightjs[.]com means the loader ran, and a lookup of analytics.insightjs[.]com suggests the agent stage was reached. Hunt proxy logs for a POST to na.fleetlogd[.]com with a Referer of analytics.insightjs[.]com. On disk, look for LuaJIT magic bytes in Launcher\log\tinyget, the loader entries dd65fa4d61079e7e_0, ce2fd3f1007a9fe9_0, 1416c638b3830103_0 and fd520c7c0f65c2d7_0 under tbs_cache\Code Cache\js\, and temp files named k2f-bcreds-* or k2f_screen_*. Malwarebytes reportedly detects the family as Trojan.Loader.K2F and Trojan.Trace.K2F, while Microsoft Defender Offline missed the DLL on one machine.

Mitigation and response

  1. Run the researcher’s NIKKE Launcher Check tool before deleting anything, because the cache holds the evidence.
  2. Delete %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache (and any _hmt or _google variants, or the Proton prefix copy) before reopening the launcher.
  3. Block the domains and both IP addresses above at DNS, proxy and firewall.
  4. On infected hosts, disconnect, delete the HKCU CLSID key, restart, then remove the 64-hex PlatformExperienceHelper subfolder. Reimaging is the safest option.
  5. From a clean device, change passwords, sign out of all sessions, enable two-factor authentication, and revoke SSH keys, API tokens and cloud credentials.
  6. Move crypto funds to a new wallet with a new seed phrase.

Analyst take

This is the same pattern we saw when a hijacked DebugBear script drained Polymarket traders: trusted JavaScript fetched at runtime from infrastructure the victim never audits. The difference is reach. A game launcher with tens of millions of downloads and administrator rights is a better delivery vehicle than most malvertising, and five weeks of dwell time on a publisher CDN points to weak integrity monitoring of static assets.

The people who should worry most are not casual players but developers who game on their work machines. K2F’s target list reads like a cloud intrusion shopping list, and stolen GitHub, npm or AWS tokens turn one infected gaming PC into a corporate incident, much like the developer-workstation entry point behind the Binance heist. Security teams should ask whether gaming launchers are allowed on endpoints that hold production secrets.

What to do now

0 of 6 done

Questions readers ask

Was the NIKKE launcher hacked?

Yes. Four launcher JavaScript files on Level Infinite's CDN were tampered with from 27 September to early November 2026, and Level Infinite acknowledged possible third-party tampering on 4 November.

How do I know if K2F infected my PC?

Search Launcher/intl_service/debug.log in the NIKKE folder for k2f_chan; the sequence k2f_chan registered, adopted, agent started indicates the agent ran.

Is the NIKKE mobile game affected?

The reports concern only the PC launcher, including Linux and Steam Deck users running it through Proton.

Sources

  1. MotherSphere (GitHub): NIKKE launcher compromise technical write-upgist.github.com
  2. Inven Global: NIKKE PC launcher reportedly hit by supply-chain attackinvenglobal.com
  3. Aviatrix: NIKKE PC game launcher hacked to spread remote access, data-stealing malwareaviatrix.ai
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