NIKKE Launcher Supply Chain Attack Planted K2F RAT via Tampered CDN
For about five weeks, four JavaScript files on Level Infinite's CDN made the NIKKE PC launcher fetch a LuaJIT remote access agent called K2F that steals browser passwords, developer and cloud secrets, and 28 crypto wallet extensions.
Threat card
- Threat type
- Infostealers
- Disclosed
- Nov 3, 2026
- Affected
- NIKKE PC launcher (Windows, plus Linux and Steam Deck via Proton) opened between 27 Sep and 4 Nov 2026
The short version
- Four JavaScript files on Level Infinite's CDN were modified on 27 September 2026 to load attacker code into the NIKKE PC launcher.
- The loader delivered K2F, a LuaJIT remote access agent that runs commands, takes screenshots and steals credentials.
- K2F targets browser passwords and cookies, SSH keys, cloud and developer tokens, and 28 crypto wallet extensions.
- The files were clean by 4 November, but cached copies and Chrome-based persistence can survive on infected machines.
The NIKKE launcher supply chain attack turned the official PC launcher for Goddess of Victory: NIKKE into a delivery channel for a remote access agent. Between 27 September and 4 November 2026, four JavaScript files served from publisher Level Infinite’s CDN were modified so that the launcher pulled a LuaJIT payload, tracked as K2F malware, from attacker infrastructure. The agent can run commands, take screenshots and harvest saved passwords, SSH keys, cloud tokens and crypto wallets. Anyone who opened the PC launcher in that window should check for infection and rotate secrets now.
What happened
Attackers gained write access to launcher assets on Level Infinite’s CDN and injected a small loader into four JavaScript files that the NIKKE PC launcher loads at startup. On some launches the loader fetched a second stage, which installed the K2F agent inside the launcher’s embedded browser and could persist through Chrome. How the attacker obtained CDN write access is not disclosed.
The compromise was first pieced together by players on the Chinese forum NGA and then documented in a detailed independent technical write-up on GitHub, which analysed the payload statically without running it. Inven Global reported on 3 November that neither SHIFT UP nor Level Infinite had commented at that point. According to the write-up, Level Infinite posted a statement on X on 4 November saying the launcher’s script files “may have been tampered with by a third party”, without naming files or giving users remediation steps.
The reports concern only the PC launcher. The mobile versions of the game are not named as affected. Linux and Steam Deck users who run the launcher through Proton are exposed as well, because Wine maps the Linux home folder into the Windows environment.
Timeline
| Date (GMT) | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-09-27 01:59 | Domain insightjs[.]com registered; first TLS certificate issued about an hour later |
| 2026-09-27 06:41 to 06:42 | Four launcher JavaScript files on the CDN modified |
| 2026-09-30 | Earliest reported loader lookups |
| 2026-10-06 | First certificate for analytics.insightjs[.]com |
| 2026-10-21 to 10-23 | Infrastructure moves from 89.126.250[.]172 to 89.127.233[.]127 |
| 2026-10-23 16:40 | Earliest reported K2F agent start on a victim machine |
| 2026-10-28 15:46 | FeedList.feb647c9.js cleaned at origin, but some CDN nodes kept serving the modified copy |
| 2026-11-03 | Inven Global reports the compromise; modified files replaced from 17:04; attacker server stops answering at 18:31 |
| 2026-11-04 03:13 | Level Infinite statement on X acknowledges possible third-party tampering |
| 2026-11-04 11:20 | All four files clean on the four CDN servers checked by the researcher |
| 2026-11-05 | Aviatrix publishes its analysis of the campaign |
How the NIKKE launcher supply chain attack works
Initial access: poisoned CDN scripts
The modified files were aegis-fix.min.js, images.7fec4c32.js, FeedList.feb647c9.js and vue-bucket.min.js, hosted on Level Infinite’s playerinfinite[.]com CDN. Each loaded hxxps://insightjs[.]com/l.js with a different f= parameter. The URL was hidden in an integer array decoded with TextDecoder, and the injected code added a script tag and then removed it. If the .com domain failed for 30 seconds, it retried insightjs[.]org, building the TLD with String.fromCharCode. In FeedList.feb647c9.js the 708 added bytes sat before the final export statement, so a check that only reads the end of the file misses them, as the technical write-up notes.
Execution: LuaJIT second stage
The loader fetched hxxps://analytics.insightjs[.]com/comm/assets/insight.bundle, a 205,135 byte file in the reference copy. It was written under a misleading .log name in Launcher\log\tinyget\, executed, then deleted. At least seven builds were observed. The agent is stripped LuaJIT 2.0 bytecode obfuscated with Prometheus, and any file in that folder starting with the bytes 1B 4C 4A 01 is the agent.
Command and control through the launcher
K2F has no direct network code. It registers a channel named k2f_chan with the launcher’s comm_center and relays all traffic through l.js inside the embedded browser tbs_browser.exe. It checks in roughly every 30 minutes and stores state in Local Storage under k2f.agent.state. Windows APIs such as CredEnumerateW, CryptUnprotectData and CreateProcessW are reached through LuaJIT FFI.
Credential access and collection
Server-chosen commands include exec, file browsing and download, multi-monitor screenshots, decryption of the saved NIKKE login, Chromium and Firefox password and cookie theft, a keyscan across 264 known secret paths, and theft from 28 crypto wallet extensions. Targets include SSH and GPG keys, AWS, Azure and GCP credentials, GitHub, npm, Docker, Kubernetes and Terraform tokens, AI coding tool credentials, shell history and project .env files. Aviatrix’s analysis highlights wallet extensions such as MetaMask, Phantom and Coinbase Wallet.
Persistence through Chrome
On Windows the agent can register a per-user COM class at HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{E77CC89B-7401-4C04-8CED-149DB35ADD04}\InprocServer32 pointing to platform_experience_helper.dll in a 64-hex subfolder under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\PlatformExperienceHelper\. Chrome then loads the DLL, so collection continues after the launcher closes. The HKLM copy of that CLSID pointing to wpc.dll is legitimate and should be left alone. Because the launcher manifest reportedly requests administrator rights, the agent may run elevated.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Tactic | Technique (ID) | How it was used here |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) | Launcher JavaScript modified on the publisher CDN |
| Execution | JavaScript (T1059.007) | Injected loader runs in the launcher’s embedded browser |
| Defense Evasion | Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) | Integer-array URLs, Prometheus-obfuscated LuaJIT bytecode |
| Defense Evasion | Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) | Payload and temp files deleted after use |
| Persistence | Event Triggered Execution: COM Hijacking (T1546.015) | HKCU CLSID makes Chrome load the helper DLL |
| Credential Access | Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) | Chromium and Firefox saved passwords and cookies |
| Credential Access | Windows Credential Manager (T1555.004) | Developer entries read via CredEnumerateW |
| Credential Access | Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (T1552.004) | SSH and GPG keys collected |
| Collection | Screen Capture (T1113) | Screenshots of all monitors |
| Command and Control | Web Protocols (T1071.001) | HTTPS traffic to insightjs[.]com subdomains through l.js |
Who is behind it
The attack is not yet attributed. No vendor or government has named an actor. The known infrastructure is two IP addresses at the Icelandic hosting provider 1984 ehf and the insightjs domains, the .org variant of which was later registered by a third party and now shows a warning page. The breadth of developer and cloud secrets targeted suggests the operator wanted far more than game accounts, but motive has not been stated by any source.
Affected products and versions
| Product | Exposure | Status |
|---|---|---|
| NIKKE PC launcher (global and Japanese builds reported) | Opened between 27 September and 4 November 2026 | CDN files cleaned by 4 November; cached copies can persist |
| Launcher under Proton (Linux, Steam Deck) | Home folder and environment variables readable | Same window; treat all secrets as exposed |
| Data at risk | Browser passwords and cookies, SSH and GPG keys, cloud and developer tokens, 28 wallet extensions | Victim count not disclosed |
No CVE applies, as this is a distribution compromise rather than a product vulnerability. Specific affected launcher versions were not published.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator (defanged) | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | insightjs[.]com |
Loader host |
| Domain | analytics.insightjs[.]com |
Payload and agent stage |
| Domain | insightjs[.]org |
Fallback loader domain |
| Domain | na.fleetlogd[.]com |
POST seen shortly before agent registration |
| IP | 89.127.233[.]127 |
C2 from about 21 October |
| IP | 89.126.250[.]172 |
Earlier C2 |
| SHA-256 | cc0ad05bfe85940a6067b3a72c182d3953339129206634141926d5d0b35973ec |
insight.bundle reference copy |
| SHA-256 | 2f2aac505f486067af6831d6c75ea74df63acb1ed4e4002709c5962c68bd9203 |
Modified FeedList.feb647c9.js |
| SHA-256 | 3aaafbd612f04501a6fdb0bb8b2f8a87796223e5584ac18ea5eb180feeafb193 |
Modified vue-bucket.min.js |
| SHA-256 | 21d2fa4b6cdd15da3d5246687a01ef84fb848668144258b110606db5eb5ea7ce |
Modified images.7fec4c32.js |
| SHA-256 | 04471ccf9f6ebac477ba4ca6b408a56621bccd16118c3112720adb35e6422e3d |
Modified aegis-fix.min.js |
| SHA-256 | 4bfaf98a6b863fa79554d9eeeb18870c3f92d552d62f4bd35a72d19ea68526af |
platform_experience_helper.dll (per Aviatrix) |
| Registry | HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{E77CC89B-7401-4C04-8CED-149DB35ADD04} |
COM hijack persistence |
| String | k2f_chan |
Agent channel name in launcher logs |
Detection and hunting
The fastest endpoint check is Launcher/intl_service/debug.log in the NIKKE install folder. The infected sequence is k2f_chan registered, then adopted <uuid>, then agent started as <computer name>. In tinyget.*.log, curl perform success with total=205135 for insight.bundle shows the payload downloaded, while total=0 shows a failed fetch.
On the network, any DNS lookup of insightjs[.]com means the loader ran, and a lookup of analytics.insightjs[.]com suggests the agent stage was reached. Hunt proxy logs for a POST to na.fleetlogd[.]com with a Referer of analytics.insightjs[.]com. On disk, look for LuaJIT magic bytes in Launcher\log\tinyget, the loader entries dd65fa4d61079e7e_0, ce2fd3f1007a9fe9_0, 1416c638b3830103_0 and fd520c7c0f65c2d7_0 under tbs_cache\Code Cache\js\, and temp files named k2f-bcreds-* or k2f_screen_*. Malwarebytes reportedly detects the family as Trojan.Loader.K2F and Trojan.Trace.K2F, while Microsoft Defender Offline missed the DLL on one machine.
Mitigation and response
- Run the researcher’s NIKKE Launcher Check tool before deleting anything, because the cache holds the evidence.
- Delete
%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache(and any_hmtor_googlevariants, or the Proton prefix copy) before reopening the launcher. - Block the domains and both IP addresses above at DNS, proxy and firewall.
- On infected hosts, disconnect, delete the HKCU CLSID key, restart, then remove the 64-hex
PlatformExperienceHelpersubfolder. Reimaging is the safest option. - From a clean device, change passwords, sign out of all sessions, enable two-factor authentication, and revoke SSH keys, API tokens and cloud credentials.
- Move crypto funds to a new wallet with a new seed phrase.
Analyst take
This is the same pattern we saw when a hijacked DebugBear script drained Polymarket traders: trusted JavaScript fetched at runtime from infrastructure the victim never audits. The difference is reach. A game launcher with tens of millions of downloads and administrator rights is a better delivery vehicle than most malvertising, and five weeks of dwell time on a publisher CDN points to weak integrity monitoring of static assets.
The people who should worry most are not casual players but developers who game on their work machines. K2F’s target list reads like a cloud intrusion shopping list, and stolen GitHub, npm or AWS tokens turn one infected gaming PC into a corporate incident, much like the developer-workstation entry point behind the Binance heist. Security teams should ask whether gaming launchers are allowed on endpoints that hold production secrets.
What to do now
0 of 6 done
Questions readers ask
Was the NIKKE launcher hacked?
Yes. Four launcher JavaScript files on Level Infinite's CDN were tampered with from 27 September to early November 2026, and Level Infinite acknowledged possible third-party tampering on 4 November.
How do I know if K2F infected my PC?
Search Launcher/intl_service/debug.log in the NIKKE folder for k2f_chan; the sequence k2f_chan registered, adopted, agent started indicates the agent ran.
Is the NIKKE mobile game affected?
The reports concern only the PC launcher, including Linux and Steam Deck users running it through Proton.
Sources
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