Remus Infostealer Steals AI API Keys, Hides C2 in Ethereum Contract
SpyCloud Labs says the Remus infostealer, sold since around March 2026 and spread through ClickFix fake CAPTCHAs, now targets Anthropic and OpenAI credential folders, Claude Code, Cursor and Codex, and reads its live C2 address from an Ethereum smart contract.
Threat card
- Threat type
- Infostealers
- Disclosed
- Mar 3, 2026
- Affected
- Windows hosts: about 28 Chromium browsers, Mozilla browsers, 2FA and password manager extensions, about 20 crypto wallets, Anthropic and OpenAI credential folders, Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, OpenCode
The short version
- Remus is a Windows infostealer sold since around March 2026 and spread through ClickFix fake CAPTCHA pages.
- Recent builds steal Anthropic and OpenAI credential folders and Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and OpenCode data alongside browser and wallet secrets.
- It reads its live C2 address from an Ethereum smart contract, so operators can move servers without new builds.
- SpyCloud and Gen Digital found strong code overlap with LummaC2 but no confirmed shared operator.
The Remus infostealer is a Windows credential thief that has been on underground markets since around March 2026 and has grown into a direct threat to AI development teams. SpyCloud Labs’ technical analysis of Remus shows recent builds stealing AI API keys from Anthropic and OpenAI credential folders, plus Claude Code, Cursor, Codex and OpenCode data, alongside browser passwords, 2FA extensions and crypto wallets. It finds its command server through an Ethereum smart contract (EtherHiding). Defenders should block the published infrastructure and rotate developer secrets on any infected host.
What happened
Remus is a commodity infostealer delivered mainly through ClickFix fake CAPTCHA pages. It removes EDR hooks, runs sensitive actions through direct syscalls, steals credentials from about 28 Chromium browsers, Mozilla browsers, password managers, wallets and AI tools, and pulls its current C2 address from an Ethereum contract so operators can move servers without rebuilding the malware.
SpyCloud published its reverse engineering work on 10 September 2026 after several weeks of analysis, and updated the page on 15 October 2026. GBHackers’ summary of the Remus campaign highlights the AI angle: stolen API tokens let criminals spend paid model capacity, reach AI development workflows and pivot into connected developer systems, while local LLM history can expose prompts, code, internal URLs and secrets pasted into chats.
Remus also overlaps heavily with LummaC2. SpyCloud found the same private OLLVM obfuscation fork, and Gen Digital’s research on the 64-bit Remus variant says its Chromium credential theft is nearly identical to Lumma’s. Both sources describe shared code or knowledge, not a confirmed single operator.
Timeline
| Date (2026) | Event |
|---|---|
| 25 February | The “DomainStorage” Ethereum contract used as the C2 dead drop is created, along with an unused test contract. |
| Around March | Remus advertising appears on underground marketplaces (SpyCloud, based on ad history). |
| 3 March | Public reporting documents a ClickFix to SmokeLoader chain carrying a Remus plugin. |
| 10 August | SpyCloud dates its YARA rule OLLVM_MBA_Multiply_XOR_Decoder. |
| 10 September | SpyCloud Labs publishes its full technical analysis of Remus. |
| 21 September | GBHackers reports on the campaign and the AI credential theft. |
| 15 October | SpyCloud updates its Remus analysis page. |
How the attack works
Initial access and execution
Victims meet a fake CAPTCHA through phishing email, malvertising or a compromised website, and are told to paste and run a command to “verify” themselves. That user-run command starts the infection, so no exploit is needed. A March 2026 ClickFix to SmokeLoader analysis shows Remus delivered as a plugin in that chain.
Defence evasion
Before acting, Remus sweeps for and removes syscall hooks that EDR products use to watch process behaviour, then performs sensitive operations through direct syscalls. Service numbers sit in an encrypted table and are referenced by hash. Strings and arithmetic are protected by a private Obfuscator-LLVM fork with mixed Boolean-arithmetic expansion, and the embedded C2 buffer is ChaCha20-encrypted until runtime. A simple sandbox check looks for an Outlook data file named honey@pot.com.pst; finding it suggests an analysis environment.
Discovery
Instead of PowerShell or direct registry calls, Remus uses generic Windows COM objects to profile the system, enumerate antivirus products and resolve .lnk shortcut files. It then steals the files those shortcuts point to, a quiet way to find documents a user opens often.
Credential access and collection
The default target list covers about 28 Chromium browsers and Discord variants, Firefox, Thunderbird, Waterfox, Zen and Floorp, around 14 Chromium authenticator extensions such as Google Authenticator and Authy, password managers (1Password, Bitwarden, KeePass), FTP, VPN and remote access tools (AnyDesk, UltraVNC), Telegram, and about 20 desktop cold wallets including Electrum, Exodus, Ledger Live and Sparrow. For Chromium it locates the os_crypt encryptor in memory and extracts the v20 master key. It also reads Outlook (versions 13.0 to 15.0) and VNC client settings from the registry. Recent builds add AI credential folders for Anthropic, OpenAI and other providers, and developer tools Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and OpenCode. Paths, folder depth and wildcard masks are configurable by the operator.
Command and control
Remus calls an Ethereum RPC node with the eth_call method to read a C2 URL from an owner-only contract named “DomainStorage”. The operator can change that value at any time, so blocking one server does not kill the botnet. SpyCloud notes North Korean operators popularised this dead-drop technique in early 2025, as Google Threat Intelligence documented.
Exfiltration
Stolen data leaves in stages. Each stage is a separate ChaCha20-encrypted HTTP POST marked with a &step= argument, and the system log is tagged REMUS LOG. This keeps partial loot if the malware is caught mid-run and lets operators track which stages succeed.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Tactic | Technique (ID) | How it was used here |
|---|---|---|
| Execution | User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste (T1204.004) | ClickFix fake CAPTCHA tricks users into pasting and running the loader command. |
| Execution | Native API (T1106) | Sensitive actions run through direct syscalls. |
| Defense Evasion | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) | Removes syscall hooks used by EDR products. |
| Defense Evasion | Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) | Private OLLVM fork for string and arithmetic obfuscation; encrypted C2 buffer. |
| Defense Evasion | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks (T1497.001) | Checks for honey@pot.com.pst. |
| Discovery | System Information Discovery (T1082); Security Software Discovery (T1518.001) | COM objects profile the host and enumerate antivirus products. |
| Credential Access | Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003); Password Managers (T1555.005) | Chromium v20 key extraction; 1Password, Bitwarden, KeePass and extension data. |
| Credential Access | Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) | AI provider credential folders and developer tool configs. |
| Collection | Data from Local System (T1005) | Wallet files, shortcut targets and configured paths. |
| Command and Control | Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver (T1102.001) | Ethereum contract returns the live C2 URL. |
| Command and Control | Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (T1573.001) | ChaCha20 for config and stolen data. |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) | Staged POST requests with &step=. |
Who is behind it
Remus is sold as malware-as-a-service, so many affiliates can run it. No researcher has attributed it to a named actor. SpyCloud confirmed code overlap with LummaC2 using pivot YARA rules, and Gen Digital calls it a 64-bit variant of Lumma Stealer, but both stop short of saying the same people operate it. The EtherHiding technique was popularised by North Korean operators, yet SpyCloud does not link Remus to North Korea.
Affected products and versions
| Target group | Examples named by researchers | Risk if stolen |
|---|---|---|
| AI tools and providers | Anthropic and OpenAI credential folders, Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, OpenCode | Paid model abuse, access to code and prompts, pivot into developer systems |
| Browsers | About 28 Chromium browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi), Firefox, Thunderbird, Waterfox, Zen, Floorp | Saved passwords, cookies, autofill |
| 2FA and password managers | Google Authenticator, Authy extensions; 1Password, Bitwarden, KeePass | Account takeover even where MFA is enabled |
| Crypto wallets | Electrum, Exodus, Ledger Live, Sparrow and wallet extensions | Direct theft of funds |
| Remote access, VPN, messaging | AnyDesk, UltraVNC, RealVNC, TightVNC, TigerVNC, VPN clients, Telegram, Discord | Network access and impersonation |
Remus abuses stored data rather than a software flaw, so there is no CVE and no patch.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator (defanged) | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ethereum contract | 0x999941b74F6bbc921D5174A5b29911562cd2D7CF |
Active C2 dead-drop contract “DomainStorage” |
| Ethereum contract | 0xF6896c4ddD2B821d5d2B3c18459Acd9b5Ec1cE21 |
Unused test contract created the same day |
| Ethereum address | 0xBeCFC3F9EB36E6Ec0E54f7A6627DA7EF648f8F01 |
Contract owner |
| Domain | ethereum-rpc[.]publicnode[.]com |
Public RPC node queried for the C2 (legitimate service, abused) |
| Domain and port | fightwa[.]biz:5902 |
C2 server |
| File artefact | honey@pot.com.pst |
Sandbox check target |
| Network marker | REMUS LOG, &step= |
Log tag and staged exfiltration POST argument |
SpyCloud did not publish file hashes, IP addresses or dropped file paths.
Detection and hunting
- Blockchain lookups from workstations: alert on JSON-RPC
eth_calltraffic to public Ethereum nodes, includingethereum-rpc[.]publicnode[.]com, from hosts with no business need for blockchain access. - ClickFix process trees: hunt for
explorer.exeor a browser spawningpowershell.exe,mshta.exeorcmd.exewith encoded or download commands, and check the RunMRU registry key for pasted commands. - Unusual file access: look for one process reading many browser profile folders, wallet directories, password manager vaults and AI tool folders in a short window.
- Staged POSTs: proxy logs showing repeated small encrypted POSTs to the same host with a
step=parameter, or tofightwa[.]bizon port 5902. - YARA: run SpyCloud’s
OLLVM_MBA_Multiply_XOR_Decoderrule (full text in the SpyCloud post) across samples and memory captures to catch OLLVM-obfuscated stealers from the Lumma family.
Mitigation and response
- Block
fightwa[.]bizand, where business allows, public Ethereum RPC endpoints from user devices. - Isolate and reimage any host with Remus indicators; cleaning in place is not enough for a stealer that already exfiltrated data.
- Rotate secrets from infected hosts: OpenAI and Anthropic API keys, cloud and source control tokens, VPN and remote access passwords, and move wallet funds to new keys. Revoke browser sessions.
- Review AI usage logs for unexpected spend, new keys or calls from unknown IPs.
- Harden storage of secrets: keep AI API keys in a managed secret store, not in browser profiles, chat tool folders, repositories or plaintext config files.
- Train and restrict: teach staff that no CAPTCHA asks them to paste commands, and limit the Run dialog and script hosts where you can.
Analyst take
Remus shows where the infostealer market is heading. AI API keys and coding assistant folders are now standard loot, sitting next to browser passwords and wallets, because a stolen key converts straight into paid compute and a developer’s chat history can hold source code and secrets. Engineering teams that adopted AI tools fast often left keys in plaintext files, which is exactly what stealers collect. The same theme appeared in our coverage of the Fireworks AI LLMjacking breach.
The EtherHiding C2 design is the other warning. Takedowns of a single server matter less when the address lives in a smart contract the operator can rewrite in seconds, as we also saw in the bee-js supply chain attack. Detection has to move to behaviour: user-pasted commands, bulk credential file reads and blockchain lookups from ordinary office laptops. Organisations with large developer populations and crypto exposure should worry most.
What to do now
0 of 5 done
Questions readers ask
What is the Remus infostealer?
Remus is a Windows malware-as-a-service stealer, seen since around March 2026, that takes browser passwords, 2FA data, crypto wallets and AI API keys.
How does Remus infect computers?
Mainly through ClickFix fake CAPTCHA pages that trick users into pasting and running a command, sometimes via a SmokeLoader chain.
How do I detect Remus?
Look for eth_call traffic to public Ethereum RPC nodes, connections to fightwa[.]biz, staged POSTs with a step= parameter, and ClickFix process trees.
Sources
- SpyCloud: Remus, a new infostealerspycloud.com
- Gen Digital: Remus, 64-bit variant of Lumma Stealergendigital.com
- Sidequest Lab: ClickFix to SmokeLoader with Remus pluginsidequest-lab.com
- GBHackers: New Remus Infostealer Steals OpenAI and Anthropic API Tokensgbhackers.com
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