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Fake Security Tools on GitHub Hit 2,000+ PCs With AsyncRAT and Stealer

Doctor Web says fake scanning and log analysis tools on GitHub hide a PowerShell stager behind whitespace, then load Trojan.Loader.3261, AsyncRAT, a crypto clipper and a Telegram stealer on more than 2,000 PCs.

Fake Security Tools on GitHub Hit 2,000+ PCs With AsyncRAT and Stealer

Threat card

Threat type
Infostealers
Disclosed
Nov 5, 2026
Affected
Windows PCs that built or ran fake security tool repositories on GitHub (Visual Studio, Python and Go projects); more than 2,000 infected

The short version

  • Fake GitHub security tools hide a PowerShell command behind long runs of whitespace or in Visual Studio pre-build events.
  • The chain installs Trojan.Loader.3261, an Electron loader that disables Defender, removes other antivirus and kills System Restore and VSS.
  • Final payloads are AsyncRAT, a crypto clipboard clipper and an Electron stealer that exfiltrates through Telegram bots.
  • Doctor Web counted more than 2,000 infected PCs and published domains, an IP and a full IOC list.

A long-running malware operation is now planting fake security tools on GitHub to infect the people whose job is to catch it. Doctor Web reported on 5 November 2026 that repositories posing as scanning, testing and log analysis utilities hide a PowerShell command that installs Trojan.Loader.3261, an Electron loader that disables Windows defences and deploys AsyncRAT, a crypto clipper and a Telegram-based stealer. More than 2,000 PCs were infected at the time of research. Anyone who cloned and built an unfamiliar security project from GitHub recently should check for the paths and domains below.

What happened

A threat actor publishes GitHub repositories that look like small security utilities, such as a parser for Fscan network scanner output. Malicious code sits after long runs of whitespace in Visual Studio, Python and Go files, so the payload runs when the project is built or executed and fetches a modular loader that ends in a backdoor and an infostealer.

According to the Doctor Web analysis of the campaign, the operation started about two years earlier with repositories aimed at cryptocurrency wallet users: Visual Studio projects for blockchain games, game bots and cheats, including one tied to the Telegram-based Catizen platform. The lure set later shifted to information security professionals, with projects promising scanning automation, security testing and log analysis.

The change of audience matters. Security staff routinely clone and compile tools from GitHub, often on machines that hold VPN profiles, SSH and FTP client configurations and privileged sessions. That is exactly the data the final stealer collects.

Timeline

Date Event
About two years before disclosure Campaign begins with malicious Visual Studio projects themed on blockchain games, bots and cheats, aimed at crypto wallet users.
Later phase (date not disclosed) Lures switch to fake security tools, including a bogus Fscan output parser; payloads hidden behind whitespace in .go and .py files.
Time of research Doctor Web counts more than 2,000 infected PCs; loader Microsoft.exe observed at version 1.4.5.
5 November 2026 Doctor Web publishes its analysis and an IOC list for Trojan.Loader.3261.
6 November 2026 BleepingComputer reports the campaign.

How the attack works

The chain has four layers: a booby-trapped repository, a PowerShell stager, an Electron loader with several deployment modes, and three payloads. Doctor Web notes the loader is modular and still under development.

Initial access: poisoned repositories

Two delivery tricks appear in the Visual Studio projects. A .csproj file carries a PreBuildEvent, so the command runs before compilation the moment a developer builds the solution. Other projects ship a .suo file holding a PowerShell command. In the security-tool lures, .go and .py files hide the malicious line far to the right after a large block of whitespace, where a quick review in an editor or the GitHub web view will not show it.

Execution and staging

The first stage is a PowerShell script, detected as PowerShell.Packed.270 and saved as C:\Users\Public\Pictures\t.ps1 or L.ps1. It queries attacker servers and legitimate services (YouTube, Telegram, Google Docs, GitCode and Pastebin) to retrieve an encrypted string. Decrypted, the string is a download link for Quixo.7z, which unpacks to C:\ProgramData\Windows.Microsoft.Photos. Using public services as a dead drop lets the operator rotate the real download location without touching the repositories.

The loader: Microsoft.exe

The main loader, Microsoft.exe (Trojan.Loader.3261), is an Electron application. It downloads Nexara.7z, which holds encrypted payloads, configuration and helper files. Module keys sit in Nexara/manifest/config.json under b_f, k_f and t_f, matching the boot_f, kernel_f and thread_f modules.

Defence evasion: mode3 and mode2

The default mode3 stacks six evasion techniques: parent PID spoofing with explorer.exe as the parent, a Smart App Control bypass by changing the VerifiedAndReputablePolicyState registry value, unhooking ntdll.dll by restoring it from disk, direct system calls using the Halo’s Gate technique, and in-memory patches to ETW (EtwEventWrite) and AMSI (AmsiScanBuffer). Payloads are then injected into RegAsm.exe, dwwin.exe or dwm.exe.

If module launch fails, mode2 extracts thumbcache_{11..20}.dll, adds regasm.exe and dwm.exe as Microsoft Defender exclusions and runs an injection script (PowerShell.Inject.245) to load modules into RegAsm.exe. Doctor Web also lists a mode3non variant with different bypasses and a simpler legacy handler mode with hardcoded data.

Privilege escalation, persistence and sabotage

The loader uses several privilege escalation techniques that Doctor Web did not itemise, and restarts itself to stay resident. It disables Microsoft Defender, UAC, notifications, System Restore and VSS, removes McAfee, ESET and Malwarebytes, and edits C:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts to block antivirus vendor domains. It also deletes files in system32\drivers\etc\ other than hosts, networks, protocol, services and lmhosts.sam. Connectivity to command and control is checked with PowerShell and Netstat, and failed deployments can be reported to a Telegram bot.

An unfinished component (Lodge.7z with WUDFHost.exe) is designed to create a service with sc.exe, re-download Microsoft.exe if it is removed, control startup and handle updates.

Payloads and exfiltration

Three payloads close the chain. BackDoor.AsyncRAT.115 is deployed as two identical files that use different network ports. Trojan.Clipper.688, injected into regasm.exe by Trojan.InjectNET.14, swaps cryptocurrency wallet addresses in the clipboard and sends screenshots, its version, the active window title, the user login and the IP address to a Telegram bot. JS.Stealer.191, an Electron stealer unpacked from Nexara/Nvdia.7z, checks for sandboxes and virtual machines, then collects browser data, FileZilla XML files, MobaXterm.ini, Total Commander’s wcx_ftp.ini, VPN settings, messenger files, gaming account data and Discord tokens, compresses them and exfiltrates them through a Telegram bot.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

Tactic Technique (ID) How it was used here
Execution User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) Victims build or run code from fake security tool repositories.
Defense Evasion Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild (T1127.001) PreBuildEvent in a .csproj runs the command during the build.
Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) t.ps1 or L.ps1 stager and the mode2 injection script.
Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) Malicious code hidden behind whitespace; encrypted download link and payloads.
Command and Control Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver (T1102.001) Encrypted link fetched from YouTube, Telegram, Google Docs, GitCode and Pastebin.
Defense Evasion Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing (T1134.004) explorer.exe set as the parent process in mode3.
Defense Evasion Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) Defender exclusions and shutdown, AV removal, AMSI patch, hosts file blocking of AV domains.
Defense Evasion Impair Defenses: Indicator Blocking (T1562.006) EtwEventWrite patched in memory.
Defense Evasion Process Injection (T1055) Payloads injected into RegAsm.exe, dwwin.exe or dwm.exe.
Defense Evasion Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (T1497) JS.Stealer.191 checks for sandboxes and VMs.
Impact Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) System Restore and VSS disabled.
Credential Access Credentials from Password Stores: Web Browsers (T1555.003) Browser data collected by the stealer.
Collection Clipboard Data (T1115) Clipper monitors and replaces wallet addresses.
Collection Screen Capture (T1113) Clipper sends screenshots to the operator.
Exfiltration Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) Stolen data and clipper telemetry sent through Telegram bots.

Who is behind it

The operator is not yet attributed. Doctor Web describes a single threat actor that has run the campaign for about two years and moved from crypto and gaming lures to security tooling, but it names no group, alias or country. The infrastructure shares a naming pattern (muck prefixed domains plus one DuckDNS host). The source gives no motive or nationality, and none is assumed here.

Affected products and versions

Target Affected Data exposed Population
Windows hosts that built or ran the fake projects Windows systems that built or ran the lures (specific Windows versions not disclosed); Smart App Control and Microsoft Defender are actively bypassed Browser data, VPN settings, FileZilla, MobaXterm and Total Commander FTP configs, messenger files, gaming accounts, Discord tokens, clipboard wallet addresses, screenshots More than 2,000 infected PCs

No software vulnerability or CVE is involved. The weakness exploited is trust in public code and the habit of building it on a workstation.

Indicators of compromise

Type Indicator (defanged) Context
Domain muckanthropic[.]com Attacker server
Domain muckduck.duckdns[.]org Attacker server
Domain muckcoding[.]com Attacker server
Domain muckdeveloper[.]com Attacker server
IP 130.12.182[.]172 Attacker server
File path C:\Users\Public\Pictures\t.ps1, C:\Users\Public\Pictures\L.ps1 PowerShell stager
Directory C:\ProgramData\Windows.Microsoft.Photos Unpacked Quixo.7z with Microsoft.exe
Archive names Quixo.7z, Nexara.7z, Nvdia.7z, Lodge.7z Loader and payload containers
File names thumbcache_11.dll to thumbcache_20.dll mode2 modules
Registry value VerifiedAndReputablePolicyState Changed to bypass Smart App Control

Doctor Web did not publish hashes in the article. The full list is in the Trojan.Loader.3261 IOC repository.

Detection and hunting

Start with process lineage. Builds that spawn PowerShell are rare in normal work: hunt for MSBuild.exe or devenv.exe launching powershell.exe, and for python.exe or go.exe children that reach out to the network. Sysmon Event ID 1 and Windows Security Event ID 4688 with command line logging cover this, and PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) will capture the decrypted stager.

Next, check the file system and registry. Look for .ps1 files under C:\Users\Public\Pictures\, any executable in C:\ProgramData\Windows.Microsoft.Photos, and recent writes to the VerifiedAndReputablePolicyState value. A changed hosts file that resolves antivirus vendor domains locally, missing files in drivers\etc, new Defender exclusions for regasm.exe or dwm.exe (Defender Event ID 5007) and disabled VSS or System Restore are strong secondary signals.

On the network, alert on DNS or proxy hits for the four muck domains and the IP above, and on RegAsm.exe or dwm.exe making outbound connections or calls to api.telegram.org. Legitimate RegAsm.exe has no reason to talk to Telegram. EDR telemetry for ETW or AMSI tampering in a user process should be treated as a confirmed intrusion until proven otherwise.

For repository review, search cloned projects for PreBuildEvent and PostBuildEvent entries and for lines where code follows a very long run of whitespace. A simple line length check in CI or a pre-clone script catches the whitespace trick.

Mitigation and response

  1. Block the published domains and IP at DNS, proxy and firewall layers, and import the Doctor Web IOC list into your EDR.
  2. Isolate any host with a match and treat it as fully compromised: the loader disables Defender, removes other antivirus and kills recovery options, so cleaning in place is unreliable. Reimage.
  3. Rotate everything the stealer could read on affected machines: browser-stored passwords and sessions, VPN profiles, FileZilla and MobaXterm credentials, SSH keys, Discord tokens and cloud console sessions. Move any crypto funds to new wallets created on a clean device.
  4. Hunt across the estate for the process trees, paths, registry value and Defender exclusion events listed above, since one infected analyst workstation can expose shared credentials.
  5. Build and run unvetted GitHub tools only in disposable VMs or containers with no saved credentials, and require review of build events and file contents before any tool reaches a production workstation.
  6. Restrict who can add Defender exclusions, enable tamper protection, and alert on hosts file changes and VSS shutdown.

Analyst take

Targeting defenders with fake tooling is not new, but this campaign shows the economics clearly. The same loader that harvested crypto gamers now sits on analyst laptops that hold VPN configs and admin sessions, and the stealer’s file list (MobaXterm, FileZilla, Total Commander FTP settings) reads like a sysadmin’s toolbox. The whitespace trick is crude, yet it works because few people scroll horizontally through a 50-line script before running it. It echoes the developer lures seen in the Binance fake job interview intrusion and the tampered launcher behind the NIKKE K2F infostealer attack.

Red teams, SOC analysts and researchers who pull proof-of-concept code and small utilities from GitHub should worry most, along with any organisation that lets those people build code on their daily workstation. The fix is cultural as much as technical: treat every unknown repository like a malware sample, detonate it in a sandbox, and never compile it where your credentials live. Coverage was first reported by BleepingComputer.

What to do now

0 of 5 done

Questions readers ask

How do the fake security tools on GitHub infect computers?

Malicious code hides after long whitespace in Python, Go and Visual Studio files or runs from a pre-build event, launching a PowerShell stager that downloads Trojan.Loader.3261.

What does Trojan.Loader.3261 install?

It deploys AsyncRAT, a clipper that swaps crypto wallet addresses and an Electron stealer that sends browser, VPN, FTP and Discord data to a Telegram bot.

How can I tell if my PC is infected?

Look for t.ps1 or L.ps1 in C:\Users\Public\Pictures, a Microsoft.exe in C:\ProgramData\Windows.Microsoft.Photos, new Defender exclusions and a modified hosts file.

Sources

  1. Doctor Web: Threat actors target information security developers on GitHubnews.drweb.com
  2. Doctor Web: Trojan.Loader.3261 IOCsgithub.com
  3. BleepingComputer: Fake security tools on GitHub push backdoors and infostealersbleepingcomputer.com
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