APT29 Poisoned Source: Plerdy Hijack Served iOS and Android Exploits
Sekoia links the Poisoned Source campaign to APT29 with moderate to high confidence: injected websites, lookalike proxies and a one-week Plerdy tracker compromise served n-day exploit chains that stole cookies, messages, keychain data and Wi-Fi passwords from iPhone and Android users.
Threat card
- Status
- Actively exploited
- Threat type
- Nation-State
- Disclosed
- Nov 4, 2026
- Affected
- iOS 16.0 to 17.4 and iOS 18.5 (unpatched), Android Chrome 139 to 145 except 143 with Adreno GPU; websites that loaded the Plerdy tracker between 27 August and 3 September 2026
The short version
- Sekoia attributes the Poisoned Source watering hole campaign to APT29 with moderate to high confidence.
- The operators compromised the Plerdy analytics tracker for one week and injected a fingerprinting loader into thousands of mostly Ukrainian sites.
- Three exploit chains, all n-days, targeted iOS 16.7, iOS 18.5 and Android Chrome 139 to 145 to steal cookies, messages, keychain data and Wi-Fi passwords.
- Fully updated devices are not affected, and CISA added CVE-2024-27834 to KEV with an 18 November 2026 federal deadline.
Sekoia’s threat research team disclosed on 4 November 2026 a mobile watering hole operation it calls Poisoned Source, which it links to Russia’s APT29 with moderate to high confidence. The APT29 Poisoned Source campaign injected a fingerprinting loader into legitimate websites, lookalike proxies and, for one week, the Plerdy analytics tracker used by thousands of mostly Ukrainian sites. Visitors on unpatched iPhones and Android phones received n-day exploit chains that stole cookies, messages, keychain data and Wi-Fi passwords. Patching mobile fleets and auditing third-party scripts is the priority.
What happened
APT29 operators ran a watering hole campaign that profiled each mobile visitor and served a matching browser exploit chain. According to Sekoia’s Poisoned Source report, delivery came through direct script injection, adversary-in-the-middle style lookalike sites and a supply chain compromise of the Plerdy SEO tracker.
Sekoia found the operation in mid-October 2026 after detecting a malicious script on a Ukrainian gas production company’s website. Every vulnerability in the chains was already patched, so the campaign relied on slow mobile updates rather than zero-days. CISA added CVE-2024-27834, the Apple pointer authentication bypass used in one chain, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 4 November with a federal deadline of 18 November 2026.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| August 2024 | Google documents a suspected APT29 watering hole against Mongolian government sites, later linked to this framework |
| 3 April 2026 | Exfiltration domain ad.starx-net[.]com created |
| 19 May and 18 June 2026 | Lookalike domains america250[.]holiday and theowo[.]club created |
| 27 August to 3 September 2026 | Plerdy tracker file serves the malicious loader |
| September 2026 | DarkSword iOS exploit kit sample uploaded to VirusTotal |
| Mid-October 2026 | Sekoia detects the campaign on a Ukrainian gas company website |
| 4 November 2026 | Sekoia publishes; CISA adds CVE-2024-27834 to KEV |
| 18 November 2026 | CISA remediation deadline for federal civilian agencies |
How the attack works
Initial access: three delivery routes
First, attackers placed JavaScript directly into page templates or existing JS files on legitimate sites. Sekoia lists a Ukrainian gas producer, a US chemical industry trade association, a Czech far-right political party, a Bulgarian military-related site (through a tampered JS library) and an unrelated Australian medical clinic.
Second, lookalike domains proxied real sites and appended the script to each page. america250[.]holiday proxied the US 250th anniversary site, and theowo[.]club proxied Raffles London at The OWO, which Sekoia ties to possible targeting of diplomatic delegations. Third, malicious code was added to a.plerdy[.]com/public/js/click/main.js, so every site loading the tracker also loaded the attacker’s script. Those sites included Ukrainian army, special forces and military equipment sites.
Execution: the UltimateFingerprinter loader
The injected code creates a script element that loads 5b4c8fea5cbcee273e8d830f52-temfp.js. Sekoia names this loader UltimateFingerprinter. It is appended to a minified AngularJS library of about 2.3 MB, and roughly 98 percent of the file is dead code, which Sekoia says may slow automated or LLM-based analysis.
The loader runs 61 collectors producing 394 JSON fields, from canvas and WebGL to Apple-specific features, sensors and Bluetooth. It POSTs the fingerprint to a nonce-based endpoint, and the response is exploit JavaScript run in the page. The only gate Sekoia found blocks delivery when screen size is implausible for a phone or navigator.maxTouchPoints is 0.
Exploitation: three chains
Class A targets iOS 16.7 (working from about 16.0 to 17.4) with CVE-2025-43529 for code execution and CVE-2024-27834 to bypass pointer authentication, then steals cookies. Class B is the DarkSword chain on iOS 18.5: CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510 and CVE-2025-43520 for kernel read and write. Class C targets Android Chrome 139 to 145 except 143, using CVE-2026-3910 in Chrome and CVE-2025-27038 to escape through the Adreno GPU, and it skips the Samsung Galaxy S25 Ultra (SM-S938B).
Collection and exfiltration
Class A sweeps app containers for cookie files and sends them as JSON. Class B harvests SMS and iMessage, Mail, WhatsApp and Telegram databases, keychain secrets, Wi-Fi keys, Safari history, contacts, calendar, notes, location caches, Health data, photos and iCloud Drive. Class C drops a payload Sekoia calls AndroSnitch, which reads Chrome cookies, saved logins, history and WifiConfigStore.xml. All chains exfiltrate to ad.starx-net[.]com on port 8881, and none persist after reboot.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| Tactic | Technique (ID) | How it was used here |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | Drive-by Compromise (T1189) | Injected scripts on legitimate and proxied websites |
| Initial Access | Supply Chain Compromise (T1195) | Malicious code added to the Plerdy tracker |
| Resource Development | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains (T1583.001) | Lookalike and delivery domains |
| Execution | Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) | WebKit and Chrome RCE bugs |
| Privilege Escalation | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) | Sandbox escapes and kernel read and write |
| Credential Access | Steal Web Session Cookie (T1539) | Cookie theft on iOS and Android |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) | Data sent to the starx-net telemetry endpoint |
Who is behind it
Sekoia attributes the activity to APT29, also known as Midnight Blizzard, Cozy Bear and The Dukes, which it describes as a Russian SVR-linked intrusion set, with moderate to high confidence. Its reasons include backend traces matching a 2025 APT29 watering hole report, Google TAG confirming framework similarities with the 2024 Mongolian campaign, multi-hoster infrastructure and targeting focused on Ukraine. CISA and Apple have not attributed the activity.
The exploits match ones used by commercial surveillance vendors. Sekoia suggests APT29 obtained them from a third party, noting the Class A host filters only for iOS 16.7 although the exploit works across a wider range. We covered another state-linked operation abusing trusted software in our report on the DarkVigil Sogou input method hijack.
Affected products and versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed | CVE | CVSS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apple iOS (Class A) | 16.0 to 17.4 (targeted 16.7) | iOS 17.5 and 16.7.8 for CVE-2024-27834 | CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2024-27834 | 5.5 for CVE-2024-27834 |
| Apple iOS (Class B, DarkSword) | 18.5 | Current iOS releases | CVE-2025-43529, CVE-2026-20700, CVE-2025-14174, CVE-2025-43510, CVE-2025-43520 | Not disclosed |
| Chrome for Android (Class C) | 139 to 145, except 143 | Current Chrome releases | CVE-2026-3910, CVE-2025-27038 | Not disclosed |
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator (defanged) | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Domain / IP | static.flux-telemetry[.]com / 109.104.106[.]107 |
Fingerprint and exploit delivery |
| Domain / IP | edge-ord.clouds-stacks[.]com / 95.133.231[.]28 |
Delivery load balancer used via Plerdy |
| Domain / IP | ad.starx-net[.]com / 195.58.140[.]105 |
Exfiltration, port 8881 |
| Domains | ads-it-assets[.]com, cdn.adv-static[.]com, wpvortex-mod[.]com, assets-int[.]com, adsprism-stat[.]com |
Other delivery hosts |
| Domain / IP | america250[.]holiday / 192.121.46[.]25 |
Lookalike proxy |
| Domain / IP | theowo[.]club / 188.190.17[.]232 |
Lookalike proxy, now offline |
| Cookie | VDGH_TOKEN_REF |
Replay guard set by Class A and B |
| SHA-256 | 387a7fb768db1350a9788d9704e7a72abe07152734e0ff026af72b417e36268c |
AndroSnitch |
| SHA-256 | a7d2493df00565c21587b0cad2a9fe7ca1e5590acf796da6e499be0ffde44cc3 |
Class A stage 1 |
| SHA-256 | c170fda024183645c0aa681149304e50506509c3498bb6b9a5f5ced6aa73e5fa |
Class B stage 1 |
| SHA-256 | 29d283ebd08d0cd3b2e6f4a67718d3d6e7a6be01d0613d716bce218dba57a928 |
Class C stage 1 JS |
Sekoia’s report lists further stage hashes, and additional hosts and YARA rules are available to its customers and, under TLP:AMBER, to national CERTs.
Detection and hunting
Search proxy, DNS and mobile threat defence logs for any of the domains above, especially the -temfp.js file name and HTTPS connections to port 8881. On web properties, review content security policy reports and CDN logs for unexpected script loads from clouds-stacks or flux-telemetry hosts.
For web teams, diff third-party tags against a known-good inventory and check archived copies of pages that used Plerdy between 27 August and 3 September. On managed phones, MDM inventory queries for iOS 16.x, 17.0 to 17.4, 18.5 and Chrome 139 to 145 show where the chains would have worked.
Mitigation and response
- Update iOS and Chrome on every managed and BYOD phone, and block outdated versions from corporate resources.
- Block the published domains and IP addresses at DNS, proxy and firewall layers.
- Audit all third-party scripts on your sites, remove abandoned tags and add subresource integrity where possible.
- For users whose phones may have hit the delivery hosts, revoke web and webmail sessions and rotate Wi-Fi keys and stored passwords.
- Watch for lookalike domains that proxy your organisation’s sites, and take them down quickly.
Analyst take
Poisoned Source shows a state actor getting results without a single zero-day. Patched n-days, bought or borrowed from the surveillance market, are enough when mobile fleets lag behind. The 98 percent dead-code loader is also worth noting: it reads as a deliberate attempt to waste the time of automated and AI-assisted analysis.
The Plerdy compromise is the bigger lesson for defenders. One small analytics vendor gave APT29 reach into Ukrainian defence and recruitment sites it may not have been able to breach directly. Organisations that tolerate unreviewed third-party tags, as covered in our NIKKE launcher CDN tampering report, are handing attackers the same shortcut.
What to do now
0 of 5 done
Questions readers ask
What is the APT29 Poisoned Source campaign?
It is a watering hole operation, named by Sekoia, that used injected websites, lookalike proxies and a compromised Plerdy tracker to serve mobile exploit chains to visitors.
Are updated iPhones and Android phones safe?
Sekoia says every exploit used is an already patched n-day, so fully updated devices are not affected.
How do I know if my site loaded the malicious Plerdy script?
Check whether your pages loaded a.plerdy[.]com tracker code between 27 August and 3 September 2026 and look for requests to the listed delivery domains.
Sources
- Sekoia: Poisoned Source, APT29 watering holes target mobile devices with n-day exploitssekoia.com
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalogcisa.gov
- CybelAngel: APT29-linked hackers hijacked an analytics script to hit phonescybelangel.com
- The Hacker News: APT29-linked hackers hijack web analyticsthehackernews.com
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